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ABSTRACT 
 
Australian governments have recently moved from cash accounting to accrual accounting.  In 
doing so they have made simultaneous use of two rival accrual accounting frameworks: AAS 
31 and GFS.  AAS 31 and GFS operating result measures differ significantly.  To date, the 
AAS 31 framework has enjoyed primacy. This paper evaluates these two frameworks, and 
suggests that GFS is superior. 
 
Accrual accounting has been accompanied at the national government level by the 
introduction of a new key fiscal policy measure: the ‘fiscal balance’.  This paper explains and 
evaluates this new fiscal measure.  It concludes that, given the present fiscal policy of the 
Australian government, fiscal balance is a superior fiscal policy measure to the 'cash' budget 
balance measure which it replaced.  However, from the alternative ‘golden rule’ policy 
standpoint, fiscal balance is not a 1meaningful fiscal policy measurealthough its stock 
counterpart, net financial liabilities, is. 
 
 
1. The Move to Accrual Accounting 
 
Over recent years, Australian Governments have progressively implemented accrual 
accounting in their general government (ie budget) sectors1, replacing the traditional 'cash' 
accounting system which is still used by most governments around the world.  This process 
culminated with the presentation of the annual government budget on a full accrual basis, a 
step which took place at the Commonwealth government level and in most of the States in 
1999-2000. 
 
The adoption of accrual accounting in the Australian public sector has been complicated by 
the simultaneous use by governments of two significantly different accrual accounting 
frameworks.  The dominant framework is that derived from Australian Accounting Standard 
(AAS) 31.  The other is the Government Finance Statistics (GFS) framework developed by 
the Australian Bureau of Statistics' (ABS).  The GFS accrual framework is a reformulation in 
accrual concepts of a statistical series which prior to 2000 was principally based upon cash 
accounting concepts.  GFS generally follows the international economic-analysis accounting 
frameworks developed by the International Monetary Fund and the United Nations. 
 
                                                 
1   Accrual accounting was long ago applied to government business enterprises in Australia. 
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At the departmental level, AAS 31 is not merely the dominant, but the sole, accounting 
framework employed.  Both frameworks are employed in annual government budget papers, 
but even there AAS 31 has pride of place.  Each requires the presentation of financial reports 
both on a consolidated whole-of-government and on a sectoral basis.  This paper focuses 
upon financial reporting for the budget sector of government (the so-called ‘general 
government’ sector). 
 
There are minor terminological differences between AAS 31 and GFS.  In the balance sheet, 
AAS 31 uses the term 'net assets' whereas GFS refers to 'net worth'. In terms of the operating 
statement, AAS 31 uses 'operating result', whereas GFS uses 'net operating balance'.  
However, the differences between AAS 31 and GFS go well beyond mere terminology 
(Treasury, 2000, Statement 8).  In terms of the operating statement, the two frameworks differ 
in their treatment of abnormals, revaluations and a couple of other more minor items (ABS, 
2000: 22-23).  
 
In respect to abnormals, under AAS 31 a distinction has been drawn between the 'operating 
result before abnormals' and the 'operating result after abnormals'.  By contrast, GFS has only 
one measure of the operating balance, which excludes nearly all items which AAS 31 treats as 
abnormals.  In addition, the AAS 31 operating result before abnormals includes some minor 
items which GFS considers to be abnormals. 
 
The difference between the operating result before and after abnormals can be quite large.  In 
1999-00, for example, the former was $9.5 billion and the latter was $22.9 billion (Treasury, 
2000b: 22).  The bulk of this difference was accounted for by increase in the balance sheet 
valuation of the Government’s equity in Telstra (the dominant Australia telecommunications 
carrier) from book to anticipated market value, pursuant upon a planned full privatisation 
(Treasury, 1999a: 1.20, 9.36).  The Commonwealth has, however, made no attempt to use the 
result after abnormals for public relations purposes.  Indeed, it uses the term 'operating result' 
consistently to refer to the operating result before abnormals, a practice which will be 
followed in this paper.  A potential concern, however, is that the accounting standards do not 
require the exclusion of abnormals from AAS 31 operating results reported for reporting 
periods after 1 July 2000 (ABS, 2000: 23).  This unfortunately creates scope for abuse by 
unscrupulous governments. 
 
The difference in the treatment of revaluations is that AAS 31 considers most revaluations to 
be expense or revenue items, whereas GFS excludes most revaluations from the operating 
statement.  The ABS defines revaluations as “changes in stocks that arise from price 
movements” (ABS, 2000: 9), although it might be more complete to add that they may also 
arise from changes in expectations even where there is no market price which changes.  An 
example of a revaluation which AAS 31 recognises in the operating statement is a change in 
the market value of debt which arises from altered expectations about forward interest rates 
and which does not reflect any underlying lending transaction.  Another example is 
gains/losses arising from exchange rate movements.  Other key revaluations which are treated 
as expenses or revenue in an AAS 31 operating statement include: 
 
• Changes in the actuarial valuation of superannuation and similar obligations government 
employees (unrelated to the incurring of new liabilities), 
• Write-downs of assets and bad or doubtful debts, 
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• Profit/loss arising from the sale of government equity in public enterprises at prices which 
differ from their balance sheet values. 
 
Comparing the AAS 31 operating result before abnormals with the GFS net operating 
balance, the most important difference is certainly the treatment of revaluations.  Because 
GFS excludes revaluations from the operating statement, it is approximately correct to say 
that the GFS net operating balance equals the AAS 31 operating result excluding 
revaluations.  Given the sign conventions pertaining to revaluations, it is necessary to 'add' 
revaluations in order to exclude them.  Thus 
 
GFS Net Operating Balance = AAS 31 Operating Result + Revaluations 
 
Quantitatively, the difference between these two measures can be quite significant.  For the 
Commonwealth's 1999-2000 budget outcome, the GFS net operating balance was $13.4 
billion, whereas the AAS 31 operating result was, as mentioned above, $9.5 billion.  The 
difference was largely due to revaluations. 
 
The appropriateness or otherwise of including revaluations in the operating result is therefore 
an important issue, and is discussed further below.  It is an issue which gains added relevancy 
in the context of the development by the Commonwealth of a new key fiscal policy indicator.  
 
2. From Cash Balance to Fiscal Balance 
 
In the period immediately prior to the introduction of accrual accounting, the cash budget 
result was regarded by all Australian governments as the 'headline' fiscal policy measure.  
Without exception, all governments aimed to achieve balanced or surplus cash budgets.  It 
was the cash budget balance which the federal Coalition government had in mind when, upon 
coming into office in 1996, it declared that its overarching fiscal rule was to ‘achieve 
underlying2 budget balance on average over the business cycle’. 
 
The pursuit of a structurally balanced or surplus cash budget was coupled, at the 
Commonwealth level and in a number of the States, with a drive to eliminate, or reduce to 
very low levels, net debt.  To achieve this latter objective, proceeds of an ambitious 
privatisation programme have been applied to debt reduction. 
 
In the 1999-2000 Commonwealth budget a new 'headline' fiscal measurethe fiscal 
balancewas introduced.  This new measure is regarded by the Commonwealth Treasury as 
‘the accrual counterpart of the underlying cash balance’, and has been introduced in a context 
of fiscal policy continuity (Treasury, 1999b: 2).  The Government has accordingly 
reformulated its primary fiscal rule to require ‘fiscal balance, on average, over the course of 
the business cycle’ (Treasury, 1999a: 1.14).  The cash budget result continues to be given 
prominence, although perhaps more for reasons of continuity and market confidence than of 
principle. 
 
                                                 
2   The ‘underlying’ budget balance was an adjusted version of the cash budget result in which privatisation 
receipts and other ‘net advances’ are treated as equivalent to borrowing (ie as ‘financing transactions’) rather 
than as equivalent to revenue.  The practice of adjusting the cash budget balance for the impact of 
privatisation receipts was also adopted in most States by the mid-1990s. 
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Fiscal balance is officially defined as the AAS 31 operating result (before abnormals) plus 
revaluations, minus capital adjustments.  The so-called ‘capital adjustment’ equals capital 
expenditure minus depreciation: in other words, net investment (or more precisely, net 
acquisition of non-financial assets3). 
 
Fiscal balance is also in effect a concept in the GFS framework, although in that framework it 
is termed net lending (ABS, 1997: 9).  Because the GFS net operating balance excludes 
revaluations it is not necessary in the GFS framework to eliminate revaluations in the 
derivation of net lending.  Thus, viewing fiscal balance from a flow perspective, one can say 
in summary that (approximately) 
 
Fiscal Balance = AAS 31 Operating Result - Net Investment + Revaluations  
 = GFS Net Operating Balance - Net Investment = GFS Net Lending 
 
The exclusion of revaluations in the calculation of what the Commonwealth regards as the 
headline fiscal policy measure puts the spotlight on the question of the appropriateness of 
including revaluations in the AAS 31 operating result measure. 
 
3. Fiscal Balance from a Stock Perspective 
 
It is useful to consider how the new fiscal balance measure relates to the government balance 
sheet. 
 
In the GFS balance sheet, the concept of 'net financial worth' has been introduced, such that 
 
Net Financial Worth = Financial Assets - Liabilities 
 
From which it follows that 
 
Net Worth = Net Financial Worth + Non-Financial Assets 
 
From this is follows that, if we ignore abnormals, 
 
GFS Net Operating Balance = ∆ Net Worth 
  = ∆ Net Financial Worth + ∆ Non-Financial Assets + Revaluations 
 
Now 
 
Net Investment = ∆ Non-Financial Assets + Revaluations of Non-Financial Assets 
 
So that since fiscal balance equals the net operating balance minus net investment, it follows 
that 
 
Fiscal Balance = ∆ Net Financial Worth (NFW)+ Revaluations of NFW 
 
                                                 
3   Which, for the general government operating statement also deducts from capital expenditure net receipts 
from the sales of assets held by budget sector agencies. 
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So that if ‘net financial liabilities’ (NFL) is defined as a measure equal in absolute value, but 
opposite in sign, to net financial worth, 
 
Fiscal Balance = - ∆ Net Financial Liabilities  - Revaluations of NFL 
 
Whereas4 in the  cash accounting framework 
 
Cash Budget Result  = - ∆ Net Debt - Revaluations of Net Debt 
 
Thus whereas the stock counterpart of the cash budget balance is net debt (where the full 
‘articulation’ of stock and flow is broken by revaluations), the stock counterpart of fiscal 
balance is net financial liabilities (again with revaluations breaking full articulation). 
 
What is the difference between net financial liabilities and net debt?  In stock terms, net 
financial liabilities is a considerably broader measure that net debt.  NFL equals net debt plus 
a range of quasi-debt liabilities such as superannuation obligations to government employees, 
other employee entitlements and accounts payable and some analogous non-debt financial 
assets.  And in the case of the general government balance sheet, the government's 'equity' in 
public enterprises is offset against net debt is measuring net financial liabilities.  Thus 
Commonwealth general government net debt on 30 June 2000 was $53.1 billion, whereas net 
financial liabilities were $71.6 billion. 
 
4. The Fiscal Policy Context 
 
In evaluating the new fiscal balance measure, the appropriate starting point is the present 
Commonwealth Government’s fiscal policy framework. 
 
As noted above, in the former cash accounting context, the key elements of the Government’s 
fiscal strategy were structurally balanced cash budgets and debt elimination.  Why these fiscal 
strategy objectives?  One reason was that they were seen as crucial to raising national savings.  
For more than a decade, Australian macroeconomic policy has been preoccupied the country's 
low savings ratio and large deficits on the current account of the balance of payments.  The 
dominant view amongst policy makers has been that the appropriate fiscal response to this 
problem is that government should cease drawing upon private savings.  This called for an 
end to (structural) budget deficits.   
 
As for debt elimination, the Government takes the view that public debt is undesirable in 
terms of both intergenerational equity and fiscal sustainability (Costello, 2000: 1; Treasury, 
2000: 1-23).  More particularly, the Government has seen its policy framework as crucial to 
demonstrating fiscal responsibility so as to retain the confidence of the international financial 
markets. 
 
These policy orientations have remained unchanged with the shift to an accrual framework.  
Indeed the primary motivation for the introduction of the new fiscal balance measure is that it 
is seen as more precise measure of 'the Government’s contribution to net lending’ (Treasury, 
1999b: 2).  And this is indeed quite correct.  To use the cash budget result as a measure of 
government savings is in effect to count as part of savings any financial assets which are 
                                                 
4  For simplicity we ignore any adjustments to the cash balance to eliminate net advances. 
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accumulated to fund increases in non-debt liabilities.  This mistake is avoided if one uses the 
fiscal balance measure.   Thus, given the Government’s policy framework, the emphasis 
being given to the fiscal balance is entirely appropriate. 
 
Logically, the stock counterpart of this ought to be a shift from a focus on net debt 
elimination to the elimination of net financial liabilities.  This has, however, not happened.  
This may be best understood in political terms.  Government leaders have invested a great 
deal of public relations effort into attacks on public debt, and the dry term  'net financial 
liabilities' does not lend itself to ready political marketing. 
 
Although the fiscal policy framework has remained essentially unchanged, the introduction of 
accrual accounting has lead to the articulation of a new ancillary fiscal policy objective: that 
of ‘improving the Commonwealth’s net assets position over the medium to long term’ 
(Treasury, 1999a: 1.15, 1.19).  The rationale for this has not been made explicit. 
 
National savings, intergenerational equity and fiscal sustainability are all medium-term fiscal 
policy concerns.   What about short-run fiscal policy in the Keynesian demand management 
sense?  It has traditionally been considered that cash surplus/deficit measures are more 
relevant here than accrual measures, and that may still be the dominant view in Australia 
(notwithstanding residual neo-Ricardian influences).  However, in the context of the general 
loss of faith in short-run fiscal fine-tuning, there is little preoccupation with the relative 
stabilisation policy merits of the cash budget result vs the fiscal balance.  In any event, the 
cash budget result is, at least for the time being, published alongside the fiscal balance. 
 
5. An Alternative Fiscal Policy Perspective 
 
It is somewhat striking that, having introduced accrual accounting, the Commonwealth at 
present appears to attach little policy relevance to the budget operating balance.  The 
explanation of this lies partly in the fact that the adoption of accrual accounting in the 
Australian public sector has been driven overwhelmingly by its perceived microeconomic 
benefits as a tool for improving the efficiency and effectiveness of government.  In line with 
this, nearly all Australian governments have not merely adopted accrual accounting, but have 
adopted a broader system of 'accrual output budgeting' which combines accrual accounting 
with a purchaser/provider model of budgeting. 
 
In Britain, by contrast, the Blair government on coming to office adopted the ‘golden rule’ of 
public finance (UK Treasury, 1997), from the standpoint of which the operating balance is the 
most important measure of fiscal stance.  The golden rule is first and foremost about 
intergenerational equity, particularly in the context of the distinction between current and 
capital expenditure5.  On the one hand, it firmly eschews the use of borrowing to funds the 
costs of current government services.  On the other hand, it defends the use of borrowings to 
spread the costs associated with capital expenditure over time in accordance with the 
distribution over time of the benefits which that capital expenditure generates.  To spread the 
costs of capital expenditure in this manner makes sense not only in terms of intergenerational 
                                                 
5   It is not suggested that the issue of intergenerational equity is as simple as this.  However, even allowing for 
complexities such as intra-generational transfers within an overlapping generations context, the golden rule can 
still be defended as a most useful approximation and as considerably superior to a balanced cash budget rule 
(Robinson, 1997). 
 7
equity, but also as a means of achieving a degree of 'fiscal smoothing' with respect to 
irregularities in capital expenditure requirements.  (Such irregularities can arise for a number 
of reasons such as discontinuities in population growth rates and the 'bunching' of required 
capital asset replacement expenditure (Robinson, 1996)). 
 
In accounting terms, the golden rule requires that governments achieve a balanced accrual 
budgetin other words, a zero operating balanceon average over the course of the business 
cycle (Robinson, 1998).  Given this, what can be said about the merits of the fiscal balance 
measure from a golden rule perspective?  To start with the obvious, because the net operating 
balance equals fiscal balance plus net investment, the golden rule implies not that the 
(structural) fiscal balance should equal zero, but rather that it should be equal in magnitude 
but opposite in sign to net public investment. 
 
What about fiscal sustainability?  Fiscal sustainability might be defined as the avoidance of 
fiscal policy settings which, if maintained over time, would ultimately result in the burden of 
financial obligations rising to levels which would lead government to default, and which at 
some point prior to that would lead to a loss of confidence on the part of potential lenders.  
Advocates of the golden rule recognise that achieving a balanced accrual budget does not 
necessarily guarantee fiscal sustainability.  It is conceivable that a government might balance 
the budget in accrual terms in the short run while at the same time accumulating 
unsustainable levels of debt to finance grandiose capital expenditure schemes.  It is therefore 
necessary to set explicit fiscal sustainability rules.  The standard approach to this has been to 
stipulate that the ratio of net debt/GDP should not exceed some specific moderate ceiling.  
This is, of course, what the British Government has done, cleverly labelling it the ‘sustainable 
investment’ rule (UK Treasury, 1999).  It can be argued that, as long as the net debt/GDP 
ceiling is a moderate one, such a fiscal sustainability rule should be perfectly consistent with 
maintaining the confidence of the international money markets. 
 
A moment's consideration suggests that the fiscal sustainability rule of this type is more 
appropriately specified in terms of net financial liabilities than in terms of net debt.  On the 
assets side, the net financial liabilities measure includes non-monetary assets such as 
government holdings of publicly traded shares, which are arguably just as relevant to fiscal 
sustainability as are monetary assets.  Equally, on the liabilities side, quasi-debt liabilities 
such as superannuation obligations to public servants imply under normal circumstances a 
level of commitment which makes an essential that they be taken into account in assessing 
fiscal sustainability. 
 
Although net financial liabilities are (revaluations aside) the stock counterpart of fiscal 
balance, fiscal balance is not a useful fiscal sustainability indicator from a golden rule 
perspective.  Setting a ceiling on the NFL/GDP ratio implies that it is acceptable for NFL to 
grow over time, as long as the trend rate of growth does not exceed that of GDP.  This implies 
that, over the long haul, the fiscal balance will tend to be in structural deficit (albeit a small 
deficit).  In the medium term, however, the application of the golden rule in the presence of 
irregularities in capital expenditure requirements might make it appropriate that during certain 
periods of time the fiscal balance should be in structural surplus6. 
 
                                                 
6   For example, during a period of markedly below-average required asset replacement expenditure. 
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What about national savings policy?  Although it is a matter of vigorous macroeconomic 
debate, here we simply accept for the sake of argument the proposition that higher 
government savings leads to higher national savings and thence to improved current account 
outcomes.  Even from this perspective, there are alternatives to the pursuit of fiscal balance.  
The context is that, while fiscal balance may measure government net lending, government 
savings is measured by the operating balance.  This means that a policy of structural fiscal 
balance implies that, over the business cycle, government savings would equal government 
net investment.  It is not obvious why government savings of this particular magnitude should 
be targeted.  One obvious policy alternative might be for government to target a defined level 
of operating surplus instead of the usual golden rule approach of targeting operating balance.  
Such an approach would preserve the fiscal smoothing properties of the golden rule approach 
in dealing with irregularities in capital expenditure requirements. 
 
It can therefore be concluded that, from a golden rule perspective, fiscal balance is not a 
useful fiscal policy variable unless one adopts a very specific policy with respect to the 
desired magnitude of government savings. 
 
As noted above, the shift to accrual accounting has seen the adoption by the Australian 
government of an objective of increasing net assets over time.  Disregarding revaluations, the 
golden rule approach of balancing the budget in accrual terms is, of course, equivalent to 
constant net assets rule.  From this perspective, the pursuit of increasing net assets implies 
undue imposts upon current generations, and reflects what the Commonwealth Treasury itself 
correctly identified in 1995 as a misconceived ‘presumption that increases in net worth are 
good’ (Treasury, 1995: 5). 
 
We turn now to a consideration of the differences between GFS and AAS 31 operating 
balance measures from a fiscal policy perspective.  The proper definition of the operating 
balance is obviously of particular importance to proponents of the golden rule, because for 
them it is the operating balance rather than fiscal balance which serve as the headline fiscal 
policy measure. 
 
6. The Treatment of Revaluations 
 
Suppose one were to apply a golden rule policy framework while using an operating balance 
measure which, like AAS 31, deemed revaluations to be revenues and expenses.  Or suppose, 
alternatively, that the zero fiscal balance rule were to be applied in a context where fiscal 
balance was defined in such a manner as not to exclude revaluations.  The implications of this 
would be that such revaluations might need to be offset fully and immediately by adjustments 
to public sector consumption.  For example, if a change in forward interest rate expectations 
led to a significant fall in the market value of public debt fell, it would then be permissible to 
immediately increase current expenditure by the full amount of the capital gain.  Conversely, 
if there were a capital loss (e.g. due to major asset write-downs and write-offs of bad debts), it 
might be necessary to cut current expenditure forthwith so as to fully offset the loss. 
 
By contrast, excluding revaluations from the operating balance or fiscal balance implies will 
generally have the effect of spreading the gain or loss over time.  Although such revaluations 
would still have an immediate impact upon the balance sheet, changing net worth and 
generally (given the type of revaluations which AAS 31 recognises in the operating 
statement) changing net financial liabilities by the same amount.  But the effect on the 
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operating statement will only be felt only over time through associated interest or other 
expense or revenue flows. 
 
Take, for example, a profit/loss on the privatisation of a public enterprise.  Suppose for 
argument’s sake that the pre-privatisation book value of the government’s equity in the 
enterprise happened to reflect its economic value if retained in public ownership (its ‘value-
in-use’), and the enterprise was then sold at a higher price.  Whereas the AAS 31 approach 
would imply that the sale profit could be spent immediately, under the GFS approach the 
immediate impact of the sale profit would be to increase financial asset holdings with a 
correspondingly flow of interest earnings over time.  Ceteris paribus, government 
consumption could increase permanently by the amount of those interest savings. 
 
What is the appropriate treatment of revaluations?  It is not possible to do full justice to this 
issue here, but a few remarks may be useful. 
 
In justifying the exclusion of revaluations from the GFS net operating balance, the ABS 
observes (1997: 9) that ‘revaluations are largely outside a government’s direct control’.  A 
key consideration here is presumably that in many instances the capital gains or losses to 
which these revaluations give rise are windfall (ie unexpected) in nature.  To require 
immediate fiscal policy offsets to the unexpected is potentially to introduce a significant 
element of instability into revenue or expenditure policy. 
 
Not only do revaluations give rise to windfall gains/losses, but some of these gains/losses are 
inherently volatile and reversible.  For example, unrealised capital losses due to exchange rate 
depreciation this year might easily be matched by capital gains on an exchange rate rebound 
the following year.  It would make very little sense to respond to such a situation by cutting 
current spending in the first year and then increasing it in the second. 
 
These considerations suggest that there is a strong fiscal smoothing argument for excluding 
revaluations from both the operating statement and the fiscal balance.  The point is analogous 
to Friedman’s permanent income hypothesis: the rational consumer (and here we are talking 
about government in its consumption role) will set consumption expenditure by reference to 
‘permanent’ as opposed to ‘transitory’ income. 
 
From the intergenerational equity perspective, however, there is the additional question of 
whether it is fair that the full benefit or burden of a revaluation-driven capital gain/loss should 
be born immediately, or whether it should be spread over time in some other manner.  To 
immediately spend any true windfall gains on consumption does not seem consistent with 
intergenerational equity.  The same can be said in relation to privatisation profits, at least 
under a number of conceivable scenarios (e.g. if the privatisation profit arose either because 
of expected future price increases/wage reductions, or even simply because of unrealistic 
optimism on the part of the purchasers).  The appropriate inter-temporal allocation of such 
gains and losses is a matter which ought, in principle, to be judged on a case-by-case basis.  
However, considerations of practicality and the need to limit the scope for discretionary 
manipulation of financial reporting probably mean that a general rule is preferable.  If this is 
the case, it seems that a general rule of excluding revaluations is likely to be far more 
consistent with intergenerational equity than a policy of general inclusion. 
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This analysis suggests that, in general, the GFS approach of excluding revaluations makes 
good fiscal policy sense.  Having said this, there appears to be at least one potential exception 
to this principle.  This pertains to holding gains on debt (and other financial assets and 
liabilities) arising from inflation rather than changes in expected forward interest rates.  The 
actual inflation rate equals the sum of expected inflation and unexpected inflation.  Expected 
inflation tends to be built into nominal interest rates via the Fisher effect.  Only holding gains 
(or losses) from the unexpected element of inflation can properly be regarded as windfall 
gains.  It follows that, in principle, holding gains arising from expected inflation should 
indeed be recognised in the operating statement.  In normal times, most of the inflation rate is 
expected rather than unexpected.  Therefore, if it is considered impracticable to distinguish 
between expected and unexpected holding gains on monetary assets in financial reports, it 
probably makes sense to simply treat all holding gains on monetary assets as revenue. 
 
This point is the flow counterpart of the familiar issue of inflation-adjusted fiscal rules.  
During the high-inflation period in the 1970s and 1980s, many economists pointed out that if 
balanced cash budgets were to be pursued, then one ought at least to recognise that inflation 
was eroding the real value of public debt, and that the budget result measure should be 
adjusted to include the associated capital gains.  Analogously, although in a golden rule 
context it is true that (revaluations aside) the zero operating balance rule translates into a 
constant net worth rule, a moment’s reflection indicates that the stock rule should properly be 
to maintain constant real net worth. 
 
If, this exception aside, exclusion of revaluations from the operating result is sensible from a 
fiscal policy point of view, why is it that AAS 31 does not adopt this approach?  No 
explanation has been offered by the relevant accounting authorities, but the reason is plain 
enough: a drive for consistency with private sector accounting practice.  It arguably makes 
sense for businesses to recognise windfall capital gains/losses in the operating statement (at 
least if they are not volatile and reversible), even though this does not make sense for 
government.  Businesses operate to generate profit for their shareholders.  What shareholders 
choose to do with the income they receive can be left up to them, and is irrelevant to the 
accounting policies which the business uses to measure its profit.  A lasting windfall gain is 
clearly part of profit, and it does not concern the business whether their shareholders spend 
any consequential income gains immediately or gradually.    Governments, by contrast, are 
both income-earners and income-consumers.  In the consumer role, governments need to 
concern themselves with the distinction between permanent income and windfall gains. 
 
This underlines a broader point.  Accrual financial reportingthe primary function of which 
in the private sector is to report profitnecessarily performs a significantly different role in 
the non-profit public sector.  Public sector accrual methodology ought to reflect this, rather 
than a pursuit of consistency with ‘generally accepted accounting standards’ as if this were an 
objective in its own right.   
 
7. Conclusion 
 
In Australia the shift to an accrual accounting in core government has taken place in the 
context of fiscal policy continuity.  The Commonwealth Government has introduced a new 
headline fiscal policy measure ‘fiscal balance’ which it views as the accrual counterpart 
of the cash budget result.  This paper has explained and evaluated the policy relevance of this 
new measure.  It concludes that, given the present Commonwealth Government fiscal policy 
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framework, fiscal balance makes good sense as a headline measure.  However, from the 
alternative golden rule perspective, fiscal balance is not a meaningful fiscal indicator, 
although its stock counterpartnet financial liabilitiescertainly is. 
 
There are significant differences between the GFS and AAS 31 operating balance measures.  
The most significant of these concerns the treatment of revaluations.  The analysis in this 
paper suggests that the GFS approach of excluding revaluations is to be preferred.  There is, 
however, one exception to this conclusionthe treatment of holding gains on monetary assets 
arising from changes in the price level. 
 
If, as suggested here, the exclusion of revaluations from the operating balance is generally 
correct, it follows that the decision of the Commonwealth Treasury to define its fiscal balance 
measure so as to exclude revaluations is quite appropriate.   This does not deal with the 
problem at source. 
 
Public sector accounting policy ought, finally, to reflect the functions and policy requirements 
of government, rather than pursuing consistency with the private sector for its own sake. 
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